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A SOLUTION TO THE EXEMPT WELL PROBLEM? THE
NEW ROLE OF COUNTIES IN DETERMINING LEGAL
WATER AVAILABILITY IN WASHINGTON STATE
Jeremy Lieb
ABSTRACT: Washington, like most western states, exempts domestic
groundwater use from water rights permitting requirements. The cumulative
impact of exempt groundwater use threatens senior water rights and protected
stream flows in certain arid parts of the state that have seen significant exurban and suburban development. Exempt domestic wells, however, are only
exempt from requirements to obtain a permit and are still subject to regulation
under the principles of prior appropriation; exempt well users can be forced to
curtail their water use in order to satisfy the full extent of a senior water right.
In Kittitas County v. Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board,
the Washington State Supreme Court held that county comprehensive plans
must not allow evasion of water permitting requirements through the use of
exempt wells. The Court clearly suggested that counties have an affirmative
duty to ensure that applicants seeking permits to build or develop land have a
legally adequate supply of water available. Some commentators express concerns
regarding whether this is an appropriate role for counties to play in water
management. This Comment argues that requiring counties to ensure the legal
adequacy of a proposed water source when permitting development may actually
provide an effective means to regulate exempt wells where their cumulative
impact is significant. Counties are equipped to determine whether a permit
applicant has access to a legal water source. The apparent regulatory structure
following Kittitas County allows the Washington Department of Ecology to
determine whether to close basins off for new withdrawals and for Ecology or
some other expert entity to handle the details of administering mitigation banks,
while the counties will be responsible for ensuring compliance by adding a small
step to an existing permitting process.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

All but two of the eighteen member states in the Western States Water
Council exempt certain groundwater uses from water rights permitting
procedures, adjudication, or both. 1 There is considerable variation
between the states regarding the specific quantity and uses of water that
may be withdrawn without a permit, but the laws share a common basic
rationale and generally include exemptions for small domestic and stock
water uses. 2 Two underlying assumptions provide the rationale for the
exemptions: (1) the amount of water withdrawn by such small users is
minor relative to available groundwater, and (2) requiring full
compliance with permitting requirements would be unduly burdensome
to both the user and the state regulatory authority. 3 But the truth of these
assumptions has been called into question in recent decades, as concerns
have begun to grow in most states over cumulative impacts of exempt
wells. 4 It has become quite clear that cumulative use of exempt wells
can threaten senior surface or groundwater rights, surface stream flows,
and aquifers, particularly in basins that are “closed” to new permitted
surface or groundwater withdrawals. 5
Much has been written about the current regulatory issues associated
with, and potential solutions for, exempt wells in the western United
1. Nathan Bracken, Exempt Well Issues in the West, 40 ENVTL. L. 141, 150 (2011).
2. Id.
3. Drew Kershan, Domestic Well Exemption in Oklahoma Groundwater Law—
Impact and Implications, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 563, 564 (2012).
4. See Bracken, supra note 1, at 195–201.
5. Id. at 199.
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States. 6 Despite this attention, states have taken little formal action to
address the problem. A recent challenge to county zoning regulations in
Washington State and the resulting Washington State Supreme Court
decision point toward an effective potential solution to problems
regarding cumulative impacts of exempt wells. This Comment examines
the effect of the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in Kittitas
County v. Eastern Washington Growth Management Hearings Board
and whether resulting regulatory developments could effectively bring
exempt wells in priority areas within regulatory control without unduly
burdening landowners or state authorities.
In Kittitas County, the Court held that Kittitas County’s subdivision
regulations could not permit “subdivision applications that effectively
evade compliance with water permitting requirements.” 7 In an earlier
opinion, the Court held that exempt wells could not be used to serve
individual homes or small groups of homes within a subdivision
development. 8 Instead, the total water use of any development intending
to utilize the domestic use exemption from groundwater permitting
requirements must meet a 5000 gallon per day quantity requirement.9 At
issue in Kittitas County was whether counties could nevertheless allow
developers to divide up proposed subdivisions and submit multiple
applications as a way of circumventing this requirement. 10 The Court
held that Washington’s Growth Management Act requires county
regulations to ensure that developers cannot evade state water law in this
manner. 11 The Court suggested that to ensure compliance with water
permitting requirements, counties are responsible for determining
whether water is both legally and physically available before permitting
subdivision development. 12 The Court, however, provided no guidance
as to what a county actually must do to determine if water is legally
available.
Some observers suggest that Kittitas County conclusively established
that counties must determine whether water is legally available before
6. Id. at 195–201 (provides a comprehensive discussion of the issues facing western
states as a result of permit-exempt wells).
7. Kittitas Cnty. v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 172 Wash. 2d 144, 181,
256 P.3d 1193, 1210 (2011) (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.110(2) (2012)). Kittitas
County is a county in central Washington State located on the east slopes of the
Cascade Mountains, directly east of King County and about eighty miles east of
Seattle.
8. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 12–14, 43 P.3d 4,
10–11 (2002).
9. Id.
10. Kittitas Cnty., 172 Wash. 2d at 175–79, 256 P.3d at 1208–10.
11. Id. at 177–81, 256 P.3d at 1209–10.
12. See id.
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permitting development. This means that use of a proposed water source
will meet the requirements of the state’s surface water or groundwater
codes. 13 Others argue that counties need to be concerned only with the
Court’s narrow holding, requiring counties to ensure that subdivision
permit applicants are not circumventing the groundwater code’s
permitting requirements by submitting separate subdivision applications
for multiple adjacent subdivisions under common ownership. 14 The
Kittitas County holding is indeed narrow, but the Court strongly implies
that a county must still determine whether any proposed land use will
comply with applicable water permitting laws.15 In the situation where a
permit applicant seeks to use an exempt well, the county’s responsibility
appears to be twofold: (1) requiring that the applicant will meet the use
and quantity requirements for a permit exemption, and (2) to the extent
the county has authority to do so, ensuring new exempt well use will not
impair senior users or protected stream flow.
Requiring counties to ensure that developers have secured a legal
source of water may provide a means to effectively regulate exempt
wells where the cumulative impact is significant. To comply with this
requirement, counties need only add a single step to the existing
permitting process. Adequate information exists to determine whether
water is legally available, information that can be accessed by permit
applicants or county staff without specialized technical knowledge.
Where an applicant proposes to use a permitted surface or ground water
source, the applicant will simply need to provide the county with proof
of a valid right or claim. Where an applicant proposes to use a permit
exempt well, the county will need to ensure that proposed use meets the
use and quantity requirements for the exemption, but the determination
of whether water is available for new exempt wells can be left to the
Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology). If Ecology has
determined that a basin must be closed to new withdrawals, a developer
13. Letter from EarthJustice to King County Directors of Development and
Environmental Services and Department of Natural Resources & Parks, and to the
Director of Public Health Seattle & King County (Sept. 14, 2011) (on file with Journal)
[hereinafter EarthJustice Letter].
14. Reinert, Presentation at Washington Water Law & The Public Trust Conference:
Aftermath of Kittitas County v. EWGMHB—Water Availability Determinations at the
Local Level: One County’s Perspective (December 9, 2011). The Court previously held
that the total groundwater use of a subdivision must be considered in determining
whether use of the subdivision fits within the domestic well exemption from permit
requirements, which limits the total daily withdrawal from exempt domestic wells to
5000 gallons per day. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 15,
43 P.3d 4, 12 (2002). A subdivision developer could theoretically evade this
requirement by filing separate applications for multiple units within a subdivision
that were each within 5000 gallons per day limit.
15. Kittitas Cnty., 172 Wash. 2d at 177–81, 256 P.3d at 1209–10.
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in that basin will need to provide the county with proof of adequate
mitigation water. Mitigation banks facilitate purchase of existing water
rights to be left in stream to offset new uses, and are already being
developed in closed basins throughout the state to address this.
II.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

A.

Water Rights Permitting in Washington

Washington did not adopt a comprehensive water management code
until 1917. 16 Before the code was adopted, common law along with
territorial and state statutes governed Washington water rights.17 Courts
recognized both riparian and prior appropriation systems of water law. 18
Territorial courts recognized and enforced “community custom” as
supporting principles of prior appropriation. 19 Under the riparian
doctrine, riparian property owners have a right to reasonable use of
water that flows through or along their property. 20 Riparian water rights
are tied to land ownership and there is no requirement that the water be
used for the right to be maintained.21 Prior appropriation, by contrast,
separates water rights from land ownership. Priority of use is determined
by the date of water appropriation, and beneficial use must be continued
in order to maintain the right. 22 Under prior appropriation, senior users
may continue to use all of their water right in times of shortage to the
complete exclusion of junior users. 23 This sharply contrasts with the

16. CHRISTINE O. GREGOIRE, JAMES K. PHARRIS & P. THOMAS MCDONALD, AN
INTRODUCTION TO WASHINGTON WATER LAW II: 16 (2000).

17. See generally id. at II:1–16.
18. See, e.g., Tenem Ditch Co. v. Thorpe, 1 Wash. 566, 568, 250 P. 588, 589 (Wash.
Terr. 1889) (noting that rights of prior appropriators, as recognized by custom, are
superior to the rights of a later appropriator regardless of the latter’s riparian land
ownership); Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587, 591, 21 P. 314, 315 (Wash. Terr. 1889)
(holding that a riparian owner has right to use water as long as it does not materially
interfere with downstream first-in-time use).
19. Ellis v. Pomeroy Imp. Co., 1 Wash. 572, 576–77, 21 P. 27, 29 (Wash. Terr. 1889)
(noting that perfection of a water right is determined by community custom, and
requires an intent to appropriate and actual appropriation for beneficial use).
20. Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587, 21 P. 314 (1889); Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash.
277, 279–81, 49 P. 495, 496 (Wash. 1897).
21. City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 24 Wash. 493, 502, 64 P. 735
(1901).
22. Dep’t of Ecology v. Grimes, 121 Wash. 2d 459, 471–73, 852 P.2d 1044, 1051–52
(1993) (finding that unreasonably high conveyance loss was not a beneficial use, water
right reduced accordingly); see also R.D. Merrill Co. v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd.,
137 Wash. 2d 118, 127–128, 969 P.2d 458, 463–64 (1999).
23. See JOHN W. JOHNSON, UNITED STATES WATER LAW, AN INTRODUCTION 52
(2009).
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correlative rights of water users under the riparian doctrine. 24
The state legislature first attempted to develop a comprehensive
system for water appropriation in 1890 with the Irrigation and Irrigating
Ditches Act. 25 In 1891 the legislature added a requirement that water
users post notice of intent to appropriate. 26 The legislature further
provided that the priority date of a water right would relate back to the
posting of notice. 27 In Benton v. Johncox, however, the Washington
State Supreme Court expressly upheld the common law riparian
doctrine. 28 The Benton Court, in fact, called into question whether states
have the power to eliminate riparian rights at all, suggesting that such
rights are an inseparable incident to ownership of land. 29 The Court held
that prior appropriation applied to public land, as acknowledged by
certain provisions of the 1866 Mining Act, but that when the federal
government transferred title to a private party without reserving the
water rights, the riparian rights passed to the owner of the property. 30
A statewide lobbying effort by irrigators finally resulted in a
comprehensive surface water code in 1917. 31 The 1917 Water Code
established a permitting system for new water rights, mechanisms for
adjudication, and principles of beneficial use, and empowered the State
to permit and regulate water rights. 32 Since 1917, any party wishing to
make a new use of surface water must apply for a permit from the
State. 33 The statute provides no exceptions. 34
Groundwater continued to be governed separately from surface water
by common law until 1945. 35 “Underground streams” were governed by
24. Geddis, 1 Wash. at 591, 21 P. at 315.
25. Washington Irrigation and Irrigating Ditches Act (1890) (any person entitled to
take water not already appropriated). Some territorial laws also favored prior
appropriation. See 18 WASH. TERR. LAWS, 520–22 (1873) (granting right to appropriate
water for beneficial use in Yakima County).
26. 1891 WASH. LAWS, 327–29 (1891).
27. Id.
28. Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 281, 49 P. 495, 496 (1897).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 289–90, 49 P. at 499 (citing Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 456, 457 (1878); Act
of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 253 § 9). The Court’s reasoning in Benton is expressly
rebuked by the United States Supreme Court in Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162 (1935). Cal. Or. Power also affirms the authority of the
State in enacting later statutes that establish prior appropriation as the dominant
water rights system in Washington.
31. E.K. Vandevere, History of Irrigation in Washington (1948) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Washington) (on file with Journal).
32. 1917 WASH. LAWS, Ch. 117 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03 (2012)).
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.250 (2012).
34. Id.
35. GREGOIRE, supra note 16, at V:4 to V:7.
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the same principles as surface waters, and “percolating” groundwater
was governed by common law. 36 Presumably, this meant that after 1917,
the provisions of the Water Code would apply to underground streams,
and any user would be required to comply with permitting and claims
registration processes. In Evans v. City of Seattle, however, the
Washington State Supreme Court defined an “underground stream” as
one that flows in a permanent, defined, and well-known channel.37 The
Court further established a presumption that groundwater was
“percolating” rather than classifying it as an “underground stream.” 38
The burden for rebutting this presumption (by clear and convincing
evidence) was essentially impossible to meet because the terms did not
have any connection to hydrologic reality; “underground streams,” as
contemplated by the court, do not exist.39
In 1945, the state legislature passed a groundwater code that extended
the 1917 Water Code’s permit system to groundwater.40 The permitting
requirement provides:
After June 6, 1945, no withdrawal of public groundwaters of
the state shall be begun, nor shall any well or other works for
such withdrawal be constructed, unless an application to
appropriate such waters has been made to the department
and a permit has been granted by it as herein provided:
EXCEPT, HOWEVER, That any withdrawal of public
groundwaters for stock-watering purposes, or for the
watering of a lawn or of a noncommercial garden not
exceeding one-half acre in area, or for single or group
domestic uses in an amount not exceeding five thousand
gallons a day, or as provided in RCW 90.44.050, or for an
industrial purpose in an amount not exceeding five thousand
gallons a day, is and shall be exempt from the provisions of
this section, but, to the extent that it is regularly used
beneficially, shall be entitled to a right equal to that
established by a permit issued under the provisions of this
chapter . . . . 41
36. Evans v. City of Seattle, 182 Wash. 450, 453, 47 P.2d 984, 985 (1935) (citing
Meyer v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 35 P. 601, 8 Wash. 144 (1894)). The concept of
underground streams really stems from a misunderstanding of hydrogeology in the
early twentieth century. Except in areas of limestone karst topography, which do not
exist in Washington, water generally does not flow underground in “streams.”
GREGOIRE, supra note16. at V:5.
37. Evans, 182 Wash. at 453, 47 P.2d at 985.
38. Id.
39. GREGOIRE, supra note 16, at V:5.
40. 1945 WASH. LAWS ch. 263 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44 (2012)); WASH.
REV. CODE § 90.44.020 (2012) (intent of statute is to extend application of surface
water statutes to groundwater).
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050.
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The groundwater code excepts four significant classes of groundwater
use from permitting requirements: (1) stock watering, (2) watering a
lawn or noncommercial garden not exceeding one-half acre in area, (3)
single or group domestic use not exceeding 5000 gallons per day, and
(4) industrial purposes not exceeding 5000 gallons per day. 42 Though
exempt from permitting, these excepted uses are still subject to all other
substantive provisions of the groundwater code, including both the
beneficial use requirement and the priority system. 43 The stock watering
exemption is not limited as to quantity: any stock water use is eligible
for the exemption. 44 Watering a lawn or garden not exceeding one half
acre also technically has no volume limitation. 45 Single or group
domestic use and industrial use are both limited to 5000 gallons per
day. 46
The exemptions were practical ones, intended to save water users
from the difficulty and expense of complying with permitting procedures
and to save the state from the difficulty and expense of processing
applications for small withdrawals that were likely to have only de
minimus impact. 47 Exempt well use today is cumulatively very
significant. In the last few decades, suburban and ex-urban development
has expanded into rural unincorporated areas, and developers have
utilized the “single or group domestic” use exemption to provide water
for a significant portion of the State’s residential growth. 48 Hundreds of
thousands of acre-feet are withdrawn each year from exempt wells, 49
posing significant problems for Ecology in administering the State’s
waters, as well as potentially threatening critical in-stream flows in some
basins. 50

42. Id.
43. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.44.035, 110, 130 (2012).
44. Five Corners Family Farmers v. Washington, 173 Wash. 2d 296, 313, 286 P.3d
892, 901 (2012).
45. See id. (exempt use categories are limited only by the qualifying phrase
following the category); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2012). Because exempt well use
is limited by beneficial use and prohibitions on waste, it is not conceivable that use of
more than 5000 gallons per day would be allowable for a half acre lawn or garden.
46. See Five Corners Family Farmers, 173 Wash. 2d at 313, 268 P.3d at 901; WASH.
REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2012).
47. See Robert N. Caldwell, Six-Packs for Subdivisions: The Cumulative Effects of
Washington’s Domestic Well Exemption, 28 ENVTL. L. 1099, 1103 (1998).
48. Id. at 1105–07.
49. An acre-foot is the typical measurement of large volumes of water in the United
States. It is the volume required to cover one acre of land with one foot of water. One
acre-foot equals approximately 325,853 gallons.
50. Caldwell, supra note 47, at 1108–10.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol3/iss1/3

8

Lieb: A Solution to the Exempt Well Problem? The New Role of Counties i

68

WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 3:1

III. THE USE OF EXEMPT WELLS IN SUBDIVISIONS
The exempt well provision provides an attractive option for
developers to avoid the cost and delay of the water rights permitting
process, as well as the higher regulatory scrutiny of an officially
recorded right. Consequently, between the 1980s and early 2000s
developers commonly used either the individual domestic exemption by
drilling a single exempt well for each parcel within a development or the
group domestic exemption by creating “Group B” water systems. 51
Group B is a classification of public water systems governed by
Washington Department of Health regulations in which a single
domestic well may be drilled to serve six residences (three residences for
wells east of the Cascade Mountains). 52 In 1997, the Attorney General
opined that this use of exempt wells was unlawful, 53 and in 2002 the
Washington State Supreme Court agreed.54
A.

Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC

In 1999, Campbell & Gwinn, LLC notified Ecology that it intended to
drill permit-exempt wells on twenty individual lots it owned in Yakima
County near Ahtanum Creek. An Ecology employee who reviewed the
notice believed that the twenty lots were part of one project. That
employee was concerned that drilling exempt wells as proposed would
be inconsistent with a 1997 Attorney General’s opinion, taking the
position that all water use within a subdivision constituted one
withdrawal for the purposes of RCW 90.44.050, and therefore the permit
exemption did not apply to total subdivision use exceeding 5000 gallons
per day. 55 Ecology employees relayed these concerns to Campbell &
Gwinn, and the parties agreed to submit the issue to the Yakima County
Superior Court as a declaratory judgment action. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, the court ruled in favor of Campbell & Gwinn,
finding that “[w]ithdrawals from multiple wells within a subdivision, if
each withdrawal is less than 5000 gallons per day, are multiple
withdrawals, not a single withdrawal. Each 5000 gallon per day
withdrawal is exempt from the permit requirement of RCW

51. Id. at 1106.
52. Id. (citing WASH. DEPT. OF HEALTH, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246–291 (1997)). The
number of residences served is apparently based on the 5000 gallon per day limit. Id.
53. Status in Water Rights System of Exempt Groundwater Withdrawals, 6 Op.
Wash. Att’y Gen. 1 (1997).
54. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d. 1, 13–14, 43 P.3d 4,
11 (Wash. 2002).
55. Id. at 5, 43 P.3d at 7; see 6 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. 1, supra note 53.
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90.44.050.” 56
On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court held that a developer
cannot utilize exempt wells where proposed water use for an entire
subdivision will exceed 5000 gallons per day. 57 The Court stated that by
the plain meaning of the exempt well statute, the 5000 gallon per day
limit applies to the use proposed by the permit applicant and not to the
amount withdrawn from each individual well. 58 In this case, the
developer was the permit applicant, not the individual lot owner, so the
total proposed water use of the project was the relevant metric for
determining whether an exemption applied regardless of the number of
proposed wells. 59
Campbell & Gwinn did not expressly establish any requirement for
counties to determine legal water availability,60 leaving counties to fill
the gaps between the Court’s holding and developers’ interpretation of
the statute. County regulations could not allow permittees to violate the
clear mandate of the case by using multiple exempt wells to provide
water for a single subdivision. However, the Court did not definitively
decide what constituted a single subdivision, so the question remained
open whether counties were required to prevent developers from
otherwise evading permit requirements. Campbell & Gwinn was silent
on whether counties have a broader duty to ensure that water is legally
available; the Court later addressed these questions in Kittitas Cnty. v. E.
Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.
The Court’s holding in Campbell & Gwinn ended the practice of
using multiple exempt wells to supply subdivisions. Developers quickly
came up with a novel approach for skirting the statutory limitation; this
was the key issue considered by the court in Kittitas County. Following
Campbell & Gwinn, developers began submitting separate subdivision
applications to counties for many small subdivisions, which in reality
were part of single large subdivisions. By keeping the proposed water
use associated with each individual subdivision application below the
5000 gallon per day limit, developers could argue they were complying
with the law.

56. Id. at 7, 43 P.3d at 8 (quoting summary judgment order) (internal quotations
omitted).
57. Id. at 14, 43 P.3d at 11.
58. Id. at 12. 43 P.3d at 10.
59. Id. at 14, 43 P.3d at 11.
60. See generally id. at 13–17, 43 P.3d at 11–13.
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Procedural Background: Kittitas Cnty. v. E. Wash.
Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd.

Kittitas County’s 2006 subdivision regulations allowed property
owners to submit subdivision applications without submitting
information about related subdivision applications, essentially allowing a
property owner to evade water right permitting requirements. 61 Despite
the Court’s holding in Campbell & Gwinn, 62 a developer could use
multiple subdivision applications to allow what was really one
subdivision to be served by multiple exempt wells, each using less than
5000 gallons of water per day.
Several organizations, including Kittitas County Conservation,
RIDGE, and Futurewise (collectively “RIDGE”) petitioned the Eastern
Washington Growth Management Hearings Board (Board) to review
Kittitas County’s Revised 2006 Comprehensive Plan.63 The petitioners
alleged that the comprehensive plan violated several requirements of the
state’s Growth Management Act (GMA or “the Act”), including that the
County’s subdivision regulations allowed multiple exempt wells to serve
single subdivisions in violation of the GMA’s mandate to protect water
resources. 64 The Board found that Kittitas County’s revised
comprehensive plan did not comply with the GMA because it allowed
permit applicants to use multiple exempt wells to serve single
subdivisions by separating the subdivision into multiple applications in
violation of state water law. 65 Kittitas County and several other parties
separately appealed the Board’s decisions. 66 Division Three of the
Washington Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases and certified
them for review by the Washington State Supreme Court.67 The State
Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that Kittitas
County’s subdivision regulations failed to protect water resources as
61. See KITTITAS COUNTY CODE § 16.04.040 (2007), amended by Kittitas County
Ordinance 2010-001 (Feb. 11, 2013); id. § 16.12.020 (2007), amended by Kittitas
County Ordinance 2010-014 (Dec. 21, 2010).
62. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d at 14, 43 P.3d at 11.
63. Kittitas Cnty. v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 172 Wash. 2d 144, 152,
256 P.3d 1193, 1197 (2011).
64. Kittitas Cnty. Conservation v. Kittitas Cnty., No. 07-1-0015, 2008 WL 1766717,
1 (E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd. March 21, 2008).
65. Id. at 9.
66. Kittitas Cnty., 172 Wash. 2d at 151, 256 P.3d at 1196.
67. Id. at 152, 256 P.3d at 1197. The Board also decided several other issues relating
to Kittitas County’s comprehensive plan, and the Court considered eight issues raised
by petitioners concerning the Board’s decision. This Comment examines only the
impact of the Court’s decision on the eighth issue, whether “the Board properly
determined that the County failed to protect water by not requiring disclosure of
common ownership in subdivision applications.”
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required by the GMA because the regulations allowed permit applicants
to evade water rights permitting requirements. 68
IV. COUNTY ZONING REGULATIONS MUST NOT ALLOW
MULTIPLE SUBDIVISION APPLICATIONS FOR
ADJACENT COMMONLY OWNED PROPERTY
A.

The Growth Management Act Requires Water Resource
Protection

The GMA directs counties to ensure adequate water supply by
requiring that building permit applicants provide evidence of an
“adequate water supply for the intended use of the building.” 69 The
GMA further requires that the mandatory land use element of a county’s
comprehensive plan must provide for protection of surface and
groundwater resources. 70 Of particular importance in Kittitas County is
the GMA requirement that building permit applicants submit evidence of
adequate water supply, 71 and the requirement that a city or county
enforce the provision and ensure that water supply is adequate before
issuing a permit. 72 With regard to subdivisions, the Court quoted RCW
58.17.110(2): “A proposed subdivision and dedication shall not be
approved unless the city, town, or county legislative body makes written
findings that: (a) appropriate provisions are made for . . . potable water
supplies.” 73 Counties have interpreted these mandates to require only
that they verify that water is physically available in the ground and deny
any responsibility to determine the legal adequacy of a proposed source
of water, suggesting that this determination falls to the Department of
Ecology. 74
B.

The GMA Requires County Subdivision Regulations to
Prevent Evasion of Water Law by Permit Applicants

The Court in Kittitas County upheld the Board’s finding that the
County’s subdivision regulations allowing multiple side-by-side
subdivisions in common ownership were not in compliance with the
68. Id. at 175–76, 256 P.3d at 1208.
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.27.097(1) (2012).
70. Id. §§ 36.70A.070(1), (5)(c)(iv).
71. Id. § 19.27.097(1) (2012).
72. Kittitas Cnty., 172 Wash. 2d at 178–79, 256 P.3d at 1209 (citing Swinomish
Indian Tribal Cmty. v. Skagit Cnty., 138 Wash. App. 771, 780, 158 P.3d 1179, 1183
(2007)); WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.110 (2012).
73. Kittitas Cnty., 172 Wash. 2d at 179, 256 P.3d at 1209 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
§ 58.17.110(2)(2012)).
74. Id. at 179–80, 256 P.3d at 1210; see also Reinert, supra note 14.
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GMA’s mandate to protect water quantity. 75 The Board reasoned that
the subdivision regulations were out of compliance with the GMA
because they allowed subdivision applicants to evade water rights
permitting requirements.76 The Court echoed this reasoning, adding that
“[i]n effect, the County could approve the subdivision of land, relying on
the availability of permit-exempt wells for water supply, under
circumstances in which Campbell & Gwinn would actually require water
permits from Ecology under RCW 90.44.050.” 77 The Court held that
RCW 58.17.110 requires that county subdivision regulations consider
multiple side-by-side subdivision applications covering commonly
owned property together. 78
The Court rejected petitioner’s argument that a county is preempted
from adopting regulations relating to groundwater, 79 holding that while
Ecology was the only agency that could appropriate water,80 counties
could and must regulate to ensure that land use is “not inconsistent with
available water resources.” 81 Furthermore, the Court framed the question
as whether RCW 58.17.110, in requiring that counties assure appropriate
provisions are made for potable water supplies, only intends that
counties must assure that water is factually available underground or that
water is both factually and legally available. 82 The Court made clear that
a county has a role beyond simply determining that water is physically
underground and implied that a county does have a duty to determine
whether water is legally available before issuing permits.83
V.

IMPLICATION OF KITTITAS COUNTY HOLDING
BEYOND RCW 58.17.110: COUNTIES MUST
CONSIDER GMA WATER PROTECTION PROVISIONS
IN LIGHT OF RELATED WATER CODE PROVISIONS

The Kittitas County Court articulated a rule that county zoning
regulations may not allow subdivision permit applicants to “effectively
evade compliance with water permitting requirements.” 84 At least one
commentator suggests that all that we know for sure as a result of
75. Kittitas Cnty., 172 Wash.2d at 181, 256 P.3d at 1210.
76. Kittitas Cnty. Conservation v. Kittitas Cnty., No. 07-1-0015, 2008 WL 1766717,
17–19 (E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd. March 21, 2008).
77. Kittitas Cnty., 172 Wash. 2d at 177, 256 P.3d at 1209.
78. Id. at 180–81, 256 P.3d at 1210.
79. Id. at 179, 256 P.3d at 1209–10.
80. Id. at 178, 256 P.3d at 1209 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.040 (2012)).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 180, 256 P.3d at 1210.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 181, 256 P.3d at 1210.
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Campbell & Gwinn and Kittitas County is that “counties cannot allow
applicants to effectively evade water permitting requirements, such as by
[filing] multiple, essentially related subdivision applications.” 85 Several
others suggest that the case requires counties to determine whether water
is legally available,86 though there has been relatively little elaboration
on the meaning of this requirement.87 In context, the Court’s statement
can fairly be interpreted as establishing that counties have an affirmative
duty to ensure that subdivision permit applicants, as well as other
applicants for building developments, comply with water permitting
requirements.
The Court, when asked whether counties must determine legal and
factual availability of water, decided that interpreting the GMA as
requiring counties only to determine whether water was physically
available would allow evasion of the law. 88 This framing strongly
supports the argument that counties must determine legal availability, at
least in the context of determining whether “appropriate provisions are
made for . . . potable water supplies” by subdivision permit applicants.89
Additionally, the GMA requires all building permit applicants to submit
proof of an adequate water supply, 90 making it likely that the Court
would extend this rationale beyond subdivision permits.
The debate over whether counties are charged with determination of
legal water availability following Kittitas County is largely an academic
one. Regardless of what it is called, the Court made clear that counties
must prevent subdivision permit applicants from evading water rights
permitting requirements.91 There is little reason to suggest that the Court
would not extend its reasoning to other types of development.
Consequently, counties must look to related water code provisions to
ensure that every subdivision permit applicant has legal access to an
85. Reinert, supra note 14, at 2.
86. See Jeff Kray, Washington Supreme Court Restricts Water Rights—Decision May
Impede Development in Rural Counties, MARTEN L. NEWSL. (Oct. 13, 2011), available
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20111013-wash-water-rights-restricted;
at
EarthJustice Letter, supra note 13, at 5; Dan Patridge, Court Decision is Big Gain for
Groundwater Protection, WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY BLOG (Aug. 18, 2011),
http://ecologywa.blogspot.com/2011/08/court-decision-is-big-gain-for.html
(Water
Resources Program Manger Maia Bellon suggests counties were obligated to
determine “legal availability” even before the Court’s decision.).
87. EarthJustice argues in its letter to King County department directors that when
a permit applicant intends to utilize exempt wells for a development, it is the County’s
duty to independently determine water availability because Ecology has no regulatory
role before an exempt well is drilled. EarthJustice Letter, supra note 13, at 6.
88. Kittitas Cnty., 172 Wash. 2d at 181, 256 P.3d at 1210.
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 58.17.110(2) (2012).
90. Id. § 19.27.097(1).
91. Kittitas Cnty.,172 Wash. 2d at 179–81, 256 P.3d at 1209–10.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol3/iss1/3

14

Lieb: A Solution to the Exempt Well Problem? The New Role of Counties i

74

WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 3:1

adequate water source.
VI. COUNTIES ARE CAPABLE OF ADEQUATELY
DETERMINING THE LEGAL AVAILABILITY OF
WATER
Ensuring that a legally adequate water source is available is not an
onerous task for a county to undertake. Presently, most counties are
equipped to determine legal water availability when an applicant seeks
to use permitted ground or surface water. Proof of the legal validity of
such water rights is adequate when an applicant provides evidence of a
valid claim, permit, certificate of adjudication or water right, or
statement from a water purveyor that water will be provided.92 In fact,
counties presumably are already partially fulfilling this obligation by
complying with the express requirements of the GMA. 93 Where an
applicant plans to use an exempt well for water supply, the county’s
responsibility is less certain. A county must first require proof that the
applicant will meet the use and quantity requirements for a permit
exemption, and second must determine that a proposed use will not
impair existing rights. County authority to evaluate the priority of water
rights is limited. Accordingly, cooperation between counties and
Ecology will be necessary to determine if water in a particular basin is
freely available for exempt well appropriation. However, this process is
not as difficult as it may appear.
A.

Counties are Presently Equipped to Determine Whether an
Applicant has a Permitted Surface and Groundwater
Right

Ensuring that permit applicants have access to a legal water source is
relatively straightforward in situations where the permitted action will
require a permitted surface or groundwater right. In such a case, the
county will only need proof of a valid right. A valid right can be shown,
depending on the specific circumstance, by a certificate of adjudicated
water right, a properly registered claim, a permit, or a water right
certificate. 94 A statement from a water purveyor (who has a valid right)
stating that water will be provided would also be sufficient. 95
The Water Code sets forth a process for determining the validity of

92. See infra notes 94–104 and accompanying text.
93. See WASH. REV. CODE. § 19.27.097(1) (2012).
94. Id. § 90.03.250 (certificate of adjudication); id. §§ 90.14.041–.121 (claims); id. §
90.03.250 (permits); id. § 90.03.330 (certificate).
95. Id. § 19.27.097(1).
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pre-1917 claims through adjudication. 96 Following final adjudication by
the court, Ecology will issue a certificate of water right which sets out all
of the attributes of the right, including place, purpose, quantity, and
season of use. 97 Where a basin has not been adjudicated, a pre-1917
surface water right or pre-1944 groundwater right may be supported by a
claim. Users claiming pre-1917 surface water rights or pre-1944
groundwater rights must have properly filed a claim for registration
before June 30, 1974. 98 The actual validity of a claim can only be
determined by adjudication. 99 Accordingly, if a claim was properly
registered, and has not subsequently been adjudicated, the claim will be
sufficient for a county’s purposes.
Surface water appropriations made after the Surface Water Code was
passed in 1917 and groundwater appropriations made after June 6, 1945
are both subject to the permitting process. 100 Under the Water Codes, a
person wishing to appropriate water must submit an application to
Ecology, providing detailed information about the proposed purpose of
use, place of use, and quantity of use.101 Ecology may issue a permit if it
finds that water is available for appropriation and that the proposed use
meets the other statutory requirements. 102 When a permit holder
adequately shows that the right has been perfected, Ecology will issue a
water right certificate.103
B.

Minor Changes can Allow Counties to Evaluate the
Legality of Proposed Exempt Well Use

The task of determining whether a permit applicant has access to a
legal water source becomes more complicated when the applicant
proposes to use an exempt well. Kittitas County appears to require that
counties ensure permit applicants proposing to use exempt wells will
actually meet the legal requirements for permit exemption. 104 Water is
legally available for permit-exempt use only when the use actually fits
96. See id. §§ 90.03.110–.240.
97. Id. § 90.03.240.
98. Id. §§ 90.03.241, 243.
99. Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash.2d 219, 225, 858 P.2d 232, 235 (1993)
(finding that Ecology did not have authority to determine and enforce priority of rights
absent adjudication by the Superior Court).
100. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.250, 90.44.050.
101. Id. § 90.03.260.
102. Id. § 90.03.290. Other statutory conditions require Ecology to determine if the
land is irrigable, that the water will be beneficially used, and that, if the appropriation
is proposed for power production, it will be in the public interest. Id.
103. Id. at § 90.03.330.
104. Kittitas Cnty. v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 172 Wash. 2d 144,
180–81, 256 P.3d 1193, 1210 (2011).
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within one of the four discrete categories listed in RCW 90.44.050 and
when appropriation will not impair a senior use. 105 As illustrated in
Campbell & Gwinn and Kittitas County, the 5000 gallon per day
limitation applies to the entire use of a single subdivision.106 A county
may not allow evasion of this rule by permitting applicants to file
multiple applications for what is really one subdivision. 107
Counties do not have the authority to determine or enforce the priority
of water rights; that power is exclusive to the judiciary. 108 Ecology,
however, has the authority to close basins to new withdrawals, including
new permit exempt wells. 109 This authority is granted by statute only to
Ecology; counties do not have the authority to determine if a basin
should be closed to withdrawals. Despite this, it is probably not
sufficient for a county to stop after making a determination that an
applicant will fit within one of the legal categories for exemption.
Permitting development using a new water source in a closed basin
would allow evasion of state water law and therefore would be
inconsistent with the Court’s holding in Kittitas County. A county must
ensure both that an applicant will meet the use and quantity requirements
for a permit exemption and, to the extent it has authority to do so, ensure
new exempt well use will not impair senior users or protected stream
flow.
A county planning department could meet its GMA obligations
simply by ensuring that an applicant proposing to use an exempt well
meets the appropriate use requirements and then inquiring of Ecology
whether the basin in which the new use is proposed is “closed.” If the
basin is “closed,” proof of sufficient mitigation water would serve as
conclusive evidence that a legally adequate water supply is available
without the need for the county to independently determine whether
impairment of existing uses is likely. Water mitigation banking
105. See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text. The State Groundwater Code
exempts four types of water use from water right permitting requirements: (1) stock
watering; (2) watering a lawn or noncommercial garden not exceeding one-half acre in
area; (3) single or group domestic use not exceeding 5000 gallons per day; and (4)
industrial purposes not exceeding 5000 gallons per day. Five Corners Family Farmers
v. Washington, 173 Wash. 2d 296, 313, 268 P.3d 892, 901 (2011) (under plain meaning
of the statute, stock watering exemption is not limited). WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050
(2012). Permit-exempt groundwater use is, however, still subject to all of the same
rights and privileges as permitted water use, including limitation based on priority
date. Id.
106. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4, 11
(2002). See generally Kittitas Cnty., 172 Wash.2d 144, 256 P.3d 1193.
107. Kittitas Cnty., 172 Wash.2d at 181, 256 P.3d at 1210.
108. See Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash.2d 219, 225, 858 P.2d 232, 235
(1993).
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.54.050 (2012).
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programs, which create a structured system for purchasing existing water
rights that will be left in stream to offset new water uses, are already
being established around the state for basins that are closed to new
withdrawals and basins that may be closed in the future. 110 Creating and
administering mitigation banks is complex and still evolving. The details
of the process are beyond the scope of this Comment. 111 It is important
here that the apparent regulatory structure following Kittitas County will
allow Ecology to determine whether to close basins and for Ecology or
some other expert entity to handle the details of administering mitigation
banks, while the counties will be responsible for ensuring compliance by
adding a small step to an existing permitting process.
VII. CONCLUSION
Washington allocates water through a permitting system that is based
on the principle of prior appropriation. Like most prior appropriation
states, Washington provides an exemption from permitting requirements
for certain small groundwater uses, including domestic use. 112
Individually, exempt domestic wells are a de minimus contribution to
total water use in most basins, but cumulative use of the exemption has
the potential to be significant. Cumulative use of exempt wells poses a
particularly acute and imminent threat to senior water rights and
protected stream flows in certain arid parts of the state with significant
ex-urban and suburban development.
The Washington State Supreme Court’s decisions in Campbell &
Gwinn and Kittitas County, have interpreted the domestic exemption
narrowly, making clear that exempt wells cannot be used to supply water
for subdivisions where the total use of the subdivision will exceed the
daily limit of 5000 gallons. 113 In Kittitas County, the Court further held
that counties may not allow “subdivision applications that effectively

110. The process for setting up mitigation banks is complicated and somewhat
controversial, and detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this comment. It is
sufficient here to note that some form of mitigation banking does appear to be the
model for dealing with basins closed to new withdrawals in Washington. For a
discussion of mitigation banking, see generally Laura Ziemer & Ada Montague, Can
Mitigation Water Banking Play a Role in Montana’s Exempt Well Management?, WPIC
BRIEFING PAPER (TROUT UNLIMITED)
(Sept.
18,
2011),
available
at
http://leg.mt.gov/content/Committees/Interim/2011-2012/Water-Policy/MeetingDocuments/September-2011/mitigation-banking-tu.pdf.
111. For a discussion of mitigation banking in basins within Kittitas and Walla
Walla counties see id.
112. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2012).
113. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 43 P.3d 4, 11,
(Wash. 2002); Kittitas Cnty. v. E. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Bd., 172 Wash. 2d 144, 177–
78, 256 P.3d 1193, 1209 (2011).
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evade compliance with water permitting requirements.” 114 The Court
left little doubt that counties have an affirmative duty to ensure that
applicants seeking permits to build or develop land have a legally
adequate supply of water available.115
Requiring counties to ensure the legal adequacy of a proposed water
source when permitting development may provide a means to effectively
regulate exempt wells where their cumulative impact is significant. The
answer to whether counties are equipped to make this determination is
surprisingly simple. Counties can very easily determine the legal
adequacy of a proposed water source where an applicant intends to use
permitted surface or groundwater. 116 Where an applicant proposes to use
an exempt well, a county simply must ensure that the applicant meets
statutory use and quantity requirements and that water use will not
impair existing uses. A county may determine that existing uses will not
be impaired if the basin where the water use is proposed has not been
closed to new withdrawals by Ecology, or if the basin has been closed,
that the applicant has acquired sufficient mitigation credits to offset the
new water use. 117 This is a relatively efficient solution that eliminates
the need for either the state regulatory agency to add enforcement staff
or for counties to develop the appropriate expertise and add staff to
evaluate the technical and legal details of a proposed water source. If
this method of regulating is successful in Washington, it could serve as a
model for addressing the very similar issues existing throughout the
West.

114. Kittitas Cnty., 172 Wash. 2d at 181, 256 P.3d at 1210 (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§ 58.17.110(2) (2012)).
115. Id. at 179–81, 256 P.3d at 1209–10.
116. See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 105–112 and accompanying text.
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